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The federal grant-in-aid system represents the "cutting edge" of American
intergovernmental relations.1 Eighty-five billion dollars in payments flow
annually from the national government to state governments and their local
units.2 Congress' choice among types of aid forms3 presents difficult and
controversial issues about the division of power between the national and state
governments. 4 Significant state intragovernmental controversies that federal
aid programs generates are frequently overlooked in analyses of such issues.
One heated debate concerns whether federal grant programs enhance the
power of governors to set priorities and allocate resources, thereby eroding
traditional prerogatives of state legislatures. 6
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B., 1961 Harvard College; LL.B., 1965, Harvard
Law School.
1. M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM 54 (1972).
2. Gardner, Forward to J. BURNS, THE SOMETIME GOVERNMENTS viii (1971).
3. Kinds of aid include categorical (restricted to narrow purposes with tight grantor control), block
grants (broader grantee discretion within an overall program area accompanied by less grantor control),
and revenue sharing (relatively unrestricted funds).
4. Indeed, much of the debate over the Nixon Administration's concept of a "New Federalism"
involved grant legislation, particularly whether to adopt a number of so-called "special revenue sharing"
programs. See, e.g., Fishman, Title I of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974: New Federal
and Local Dynamics in Community Development, 7 URB. L. ANN. 189 (1975).
5. Fyock & Long, The New Federalism: A Challenge to State Legislative Responsibility, 50 STATE
GOV'T 77 (Spring 1977).
6. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has stated that "it can well be
argued that the fate of the intergovernmental grants system is tied to the resolution of this question." Role
of State Legislatures in Appropriating Federal Funds to States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 97 (1977)(statement of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) [hereinafter cited as 1977
Hearing].
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Many legislators think the structure of grant programs is biased in favor of
gubernatorial authority, and have instituted an intensive campaign to reclaim
their traditional "power of the purse.'' 7 One approach is to subject federal
funds to the same legislative appropriation process as other state revenues. 8 A
second technique is to require legislative screening of grant applications prior
to submission to federal agencies. 9 A third method is to impose legislative
control over the identity and structure of state agencies administering grant
funds. 10 Not surprisingly, this movement has provoked sharp opposition from
governors and special interest groups that distrust state legislatures."l
These arguments frequently end up in court; as a result, a highly complex
and totally inconsistent body of case law on the state legislative role in federal
grant programs is emerging. 12 To date, the courts' answers range from broad
denials of any legislative power to interfere with gubernatorial "administra-
tion" of federal funds 13 to strong vindication of such initiatives.14 Courts also
vary in their responses to the basic question of whether the underlying legal
issues are matters of state law, federal law, or both.l5 Perhaps the most
difficult issue-and the source of much of the judicial uncertainty in this
area-is whether state legislative attempts to alter the institutional mecha-
nism outlined in a federal grant statute violate the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. 16
This article analyzes the federal law aspects of this litigation, particularly
the supremacy clause argument, and argues that the supremacy clause does
not govern the power of state legislatures over federal grant funds. After
examining the premises on which the federal grant-in-aid system rest, the
article concludes that state legislative action inconsistent with the conditions
of federal assistance simply renders the state ineligible for the funds.
7. The former Speaker of the Minnesota House of Representatives' praise of this movement sums up the
legislative side of the issue: "armed with an inherent right to the purse strings, state legislatures today are
demanding an authoritative voice in the handling of federal funds pumped into their states. And rightly
so." Sabo, State Control of Federal Funds, 9 NAT'L J. 1096 (1977).
8. See, e.g., Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub noma. Thornburgh v.
Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
9. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, Fall 1978, at 5-6.
10. Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, 381 A.2d 1204 (1978).
11. E.g., 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 128 (statement of John P. Mallan, representing American
Association of State Colleges and Universities).
12. The Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to resolve some of these issues. Shapp v.
Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub noam. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415
(1979). See notes 218-25 & accompanying text infra.
13. E.g., Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dep't of Administration, 111 Ariz. 279, 528 P.2d 623 (1975); State ex
rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974); MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d
608 (1972).
14. E.g., Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v.
Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979); Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. -, 381 A.2d 1204 (1978).
15. See notes 70-84 & accompanying text infra.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See, e.g., Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis at 15-20, Opinion of the
Justices, - Mass. -, 378 N.E.2d 433 (1978).
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Moreover, the application of principles reflecting federalist values suggests
strongly that such state legislative initiatives rarely should be found to conflict
with grant statutes. In addition, the article draws on the "state sovereignty"
rationale of National League of Cities v. Usery17 to consider whether a finding
of conflict might not result in the invalidity of the federal conditions rather
than the state's ineligibility.
After developing a general framework for analysis of federal law issues, the
article discusses two specific questions that courts have been called upon to
resolve: the power of state legislatures 1) to appropriate grant funds, and 2) to
designate the executive branch agency to administer those funds not-
withstanding federal statutory language referring to gubernatorial selection of
the agency. In deciding these issues, most state courts have purported to rely
on state law. 18 The article contends, however, that these decisions, in some
instances, are actually federal law holdings in disguise. Understanding federal
law issues, therefore, is a prerequisite to an analysis of the escalating conflict
between governors and state legislatures over federal grants-in-aid.
I. RECLAIMING THE POWER OF THE PURSE-AN OVERVIEW
A. THE FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID SYSTEM
Federal grant outlays to units of state and local governments are massive 19
and have grown at a consistently higher rate than most other forms of federal
expenditure. 20 The importance of these payments to the recipient govern-
ments has also increased;21 many state governments depend heavily on federal
aid, which provides up to twenty-five percent of a state's budget.22
Approximately 500 grant programs aid state and local government units. 23
Literature exploring the reasons for such vast aid essentially concludes that
the national government grants these funds to induce or increase certain
governmental activity, to influence the manner in which existing activities are
undertaken, and to stimulate innovation and experimentation. 24 The grant
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. See, e.g., MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 608 (1972).
19. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1979, at 175 (1978).
20. For example, the Office of Management and Budget has estimated that "from 1967 to 1977, the
average annual increase in grants was 16.2 percent while total federal outlays grew by 9.8 percent per year,
and the gross national product by 9.0 percent per year." Id.
21. Federal grants rose from 10 percent of state and local expenditures in 1967 to over 26 percent in
fiscal year 1977. Id. at 184.
22. The Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations calculates that in "many states federal
aid makes up over 20 percent of the total state budget. ... 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 80.
23. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE, Fall 1978, at 7.
24. See generally G. BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1967); M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS (1970).
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system furthers these national goals while strengthening federalist values by
leaving substantial responsibility for providing goods and services in the
hands of state and local governments.
B. STATE LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN GRANT
ADMINISTRATION
1. The Federal Statutes
Although most grant-in-aid statutes do not specify any role for state
legislatures,25 notable exceptions exist. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 197226 (General Revenue Sharing) requires revenue sharing funds to be
spent under the same laws and procedures that the state utilizes for its own
funds. 27 Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act28 provides
for advisory review by the state legislature of the state's criminal justice
plan-the state's annual outline of how it will use its block grant funds.29 In
addition to these explicit provisions, some legislative action is implicit in grant
conditions that require the state to match a specific percentage of the grant
funds.30
Grant statutes frequently are more explicit about the role of the state
executive branch. Some programs specify that the funds are to be granted to a
state "agency," or that a "single state agency" be utilized for the administra-
tion of the grant.31 Other statutes require the governor to designate the agency
that is to receive federal funds.32 On the other hand, some programs simply
grant funds to "states" without mentioning an agency, perhaps on the theory
that use of an existing agency is implicit in the receipt of any such grant.33 Of
course, reference to a state agency need not preclude a legislative role, because
the legislature's consent well may be a prerequisite to the establishment of the
25. Brief for Amicus Curiae Legis 50/The Center for Legislative Improvement at 23, Shapp v. Sloan, 27
Pa. Commw. Ct. 312, 367 A.2d 791 (1976), affid, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
26. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1265 (1976).
27. Id. at § 1243(a)(4).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796c (1976). This act is discussed more fully in notes 54-59 & accompanying
text infra.
29. Id. at § 3726 (1976).
30. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1756 (Supp. 1 1977) (school lunch programs).
31. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 721(a)(1)(A) (1976) (vocational rehabilitation).
32. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1455(c)(5) (1976) (designation by governor of single agency to administer coastal
zone management grants); 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(2) (1976) (designation by governor of each area in state
with substantial water quality problems). Other statutes give governors the power to establish substate
areas for such activities as health planning and water quality planning, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1455(h) (1976), and
the power to approve or disapprove state "plans" for a number of federally assisted programs, e.g., 16
U.S.C. § 1455(c)(4) (1976).
33. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3151a (1976) (planning grants under section 302a of the Public Works and
Economic Development Act).
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state agency. In general, however, the omission of references to state
legislatures in federal grant statutes has created uncertainty as to legislative
roles and widely differing practices in the fifty states.
2. State Practices
The National Conference on State Legislatures estimates that forty state
legislatures now play some role in reviewing the expenditure of federal grant
funds.34 In 1975, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR) and the National Association of State Budget Officers conducted a
detailed survey to ascertain state practices regarding federal grant funds.
Questions focused on both the appropriation of grant funds and the review of
grant applications. 35 Overall, the ACIR concluded that the findings "suggest
a continuing, fairly casual state legislative approach regarding the receipt and
disbursement of federal aid."' 36 The Commission then recommended "that
State legislators take much more active roles in State decisionmaking relating
to the receipt and expenditure of Federal grants to the State, ' 37 and drafted
model state legislation to provide for an enhanced legislative role.38
II. THE PRO AND CON ARGUMENTS
A. THE LEGISLATIVE POINT OF VIEW
Legislatures have responded to the ACIR recommendations by increasing
their involvement in administering grants. This new activism on the part of
state legislatures is part of a general pattern of legislatures reasserting their
prerogatives at both the federal and state levels. 39 In addition to the influence
34. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF FEDERAL
FUNDS 2 (1978) (on file with the author).
35. In response to the question, "What proportion of Federal grant funds does the legislature include in
the appropriation process?", 15 states responded "all," 12 responded "some," and 7 responded "none." It
is likely, however, that some of the states which purport to "appropriate" federal funds do so merely
through a blanket authorization to receive and disburse such funds. In response to the question, "What
proportion of state applications for aid must be submitted for review by a legislative committee or staff
agency prior to transmission to a Federal agency?", only 4 states answered "all," 3 answered "some," and
28 answered "none." ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL GRANT SYSTEM AS SEEN BY LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS 101 (1977).
36. 1977 Hearing. supra note 6, at 81.
37. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE STATES AND INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL AIDS 79 (1977).
38. The model legislation focuses on the appropriations process. It provides for the deposit of all federal
funds in a state's general fund, and prohibits expenditure of federal funds by any state agency without
specific legislative appropriation. 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 106. Legislation with these provisions was
at issue in Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v.
Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979). See notes 202-26 & accompanying text infra.
39. See, e.g., Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF.
L. REV. 983 (1975).
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of this general trend, factors directly associated with the federal aid system
explain state legislatures' great interest in grant programs.
Legislators criticize the federal grant-in-aid system for creating two
governments within the same state.40 The first, state funded, operates
according to each state's traditional institutional arrangements and balance of
powers among the branches. The second, federally funded, operates virtually
free of those arrangements and tilts the balance strongly toward gubernatorial
authority.41 Resulting criticisms are both fiscal and programmatic in nature.
1. Fiscal Arguments
The fiscal arguments focus on executive branch agencies' expenditures of
funds that bypass the normal state budgetary process because they are not
subject to appropriation by the state legislatures.42 Legislators base their claim
to fiscal control on two grounds. First, they argue that, functionally, they
must control the purse strings in order to maximize the efficiency of the
legislature's role in the budgetary process. The legislature must be aware of
and pass on all revenues and expenditures of the state government; 43
otherwise the budget documents do not accurately reflect the state's activities
and priorities. This fiscal consideration has merit, but could be satisfied by
estimates of federal receipts and boilerplate44 authorizations to spend them.
Second, to the legislative activists, control of the purse strings also means
having a voice in whether to spend federal funds and how to spend them. The
authority of state legislatures over these matters is not clear. If they attempt to
divert federal funds to purposes not authorized by a particular grant statute,
the state may lose the funds altogether. Legislative advocates insist that
diversion is not the goal; rather, they assert that executive expenditure of
funds without legislative approval intrudes into the legislature's sphere of
authority. 45
The proposition that appropriation is a prerequisite to expenditure flows
from the doctrine that only the legislature can raise money through exercise
40. See, e.g., 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 53-54 (statement of George Roberts, speaker, N.H. House
of Representatives).
41. Sabo, supra note 7, at 1096.
42. As one state senator put it, "We are engaged in a struggle to keep the Madison check and balance
system of three coequal branches of government, and the legislatures of this country are losing. If we
cannot control the purse strings we are nothing." Senator Harold Schreier (S.D.) quoted in ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE LEGISLATURES AND FEDERAL GRANTS 14
(Information Bull. No. 76-4) (Nov. 1976).
43. 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 61 (statement of Martin Sabo, speaker, Minn. House of
Representatives).
44. "Boilerplate" authorizations have been described as "kind of a hunting license for executive
agencies that said, in effect, there is hereby appropriated whatever funds any agency may receive during the
ensuing year from Federal grants and from other sources to use for whatever purposes for which they were
received." Id. at 51 (statement of Rep. Tom Jensen).
45. See Brief for Amicus Curiae Legis 50/The Center for Legislative Improvement, supra note 25, at 3.
This brief provides an excellent summary of many arguments supporting a broad legislative role.
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of the power to tax.46 This reasoning, however, is not necessarily persuasive in
the grant context, since Congress, the legislative body that raised the funds,
has approved the expenditures.
2. Programmatic Arguments
The legislators' fiscal arguments can be restated in programmatic terms:
the federal grant system erodes the legislatures' primary role as resource
allocators and priority setters for the state-a role that is broader than the
appropriation of funds. Two frequently voiced legislative complaints support
this analysis. First, governors and executive branch agencies utilize discre-
tionary federal funds for activities that the legislatures would not, or did not,
approve for state funding.47 Second, executive branch participation in grant
programs may commit the state to long term courses of action without the
legislature's knowledge.48 Detailed appropriation in the state budget of all
federal funds would probably meet the first objection, but not necessarily the
second, because in some programs mere appropriation is not equivalent to
policymaking. 49
B. THE EXECUTIVE POINT OF VIEW
Governors and their allies have attempted to counter the legislatures'
arguments both by legal challenges and by invoking the policies and
functional constraints of the federal grant-in-aid system. They point to
Congress' reasons for enacting aid programs as strong justification for
minimizing state legislative action. 50 Congress enacts these programs to
further national interests that currently are not being served adequately at the
state level; if the states were doing what Congress wanted, no grant program
would be necessary. 51 Clearly, Congress needs to be free to enhance the power
46. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes."
State constitutional provisions regarding the power to spend take a form like that of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,
cl. 7: "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."
Analogous state constitutional provisions can be found at, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 4, §§ 22, 25; N.Y. CONST.
art. 3, § 22, art. 7, § 7; VA. CONST. art.4, § 15, art. 10, § 7.
47. 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 50 (statement of Stanley Steingut, speaker N.Y. Assembly).
48. Id. at 50-51.
49. For example, the preparation and submission of a Coastal Zone Management Program may commit
a state to major long term regulatory and planning goals. Mere "appropriation" of the federal planning
funds would not ensure a legislative voice in the formulation of those goals. Some Massachusetts legislators
attempted to block submission of that state's Coastal Zone Management Program on the ground that the
legislature had been left out of the planning process. See Mass. H. 6687 (1977) (forbidding implementation
of state coastal zone management program unless its "policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations are
approved" by the legislature and the governor).
50. See, eg., Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16, at 4-7, 19-20.
51. This situation is not true for a program such as General Revenue Sharing, which reflects primarily a
"fiscal federalism" rationale: the national government should provide general assistance to state and local
governmental units because of its superior revenue raising capability and its more equitable income tax
structure. See W. HELLER, NEw DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 117-72 (1966).
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of those state institutions that are most likely to effectuate national purposes.
For example, statutes frequently require creation of a grantee advisory
committee, with the expectation that it will become an ongoing advocate of
the grant program within the state government.52 Similarly, Congress may
believe that governors will favor national goals in innovative programs more
than legislators will.5 3 If so, Congress should be able to enhance the
governors' role.
The 1976 amendments to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act 54 provide a specific example of a program-based institutional choice.
Congress added a new section providing for advisory review by state
legislatures of state criminal justice plans prior to their submission to the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).55 The legislative history
strongly suggests that a fear of the political nature of state legislatures was the
principal reason for limiting the review to an advisory one.56 The notion that
legislatures decide issues on political grounds while governors decide issues
on the merits seems naive; 57 rather, Congress may have felt that state
legislatures would be less inclined to support "innovative" and "progressive"
programs than governors and executive branch agencies.5 8 Some analysts of
the federal system have suggested that state legislatures are less likely to have
a broad "public interest" viewpoint than their national counterparts.5 9 It may
well be that Congress intends to limit the state legislative role in specific grant
programs in order to prevent the frustration of the programs' goals by those
hostile to them.
In addition to these arguments supporting a strong executive role, gover-
nors also have cited serious "mechanical" problems created by legislative
52. See generally M. DERTHICK, supra note 24, at 201-14 (use of grant system to increase federal
leverage over state political processes).
53. See note 58 infra.
54. Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3701-3796c (1976)).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 3726 (1976).
56. The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that it rejected the idea of placing the state planning
agency under the jurisdiction of the legislature because "[i]t would be inconsistent with the centralized and
coordinated state-wide planning which is one of the key elements of the LEAA program and render close
supervision more difficult. Such a structuring of the program would also create a greater danger of
politicization of the LEAA effort." S. REP. No. 847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5374, 5381.
57. As Aaron Wildavsky responded to the rhetorical question of why issues are not decided on their
merits, "The most obvious answer is that the question presupposes an agreement on what merit consists of
when the real problem is that people do not agree. That is why we have politics." A. WILDAVSKY, THE
POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 176 (2d ed. 1974).
58. There is some evidence to support such a position. For example, in Massachusetts the Legislative
Committee on Post Audit and Oversight has been very critical of a former Commissioner of Youth Services
for using federal funds to operate "liberal" programs for which he could not have obtained direct state
funding. MASSACHUSETTS JOINT COMM. ON POST AUDIT AND OVERSIGHT, MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF YOUTH SERVICES 38-39 (1974).
59. See generally Susskind, Revenue Sharing and the Lessons of the New Federalism, 8 URB. L. ANN. 33,
43-51 (1974).
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involvement in implementing programs and expending federal funds. For
example, the receipt of funds may be conditioned upon a very rapid
submission of grant proposals and a commitment to spend the funds
quickly.60 If state legislative review and approval were necessary for either the
application or the expenditure of funds or both under such a program, serious
operational problems would seem inevitable. Critics of the Pennsylvania
legislature's extensive involvement in the administration of grant funds have
stressed the long delays and bureaucratic red tape that have resulted.61 In
addition, governors argue that state legislatures simply lack the expertise to
deal with the complex world of federal grant programs. 62
The functional arguments against legislative involvement are relatively
insubstantial. Lack of expertise is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If legislatures take
seriously the job of dealing with federal funds, they will acquire the expertise.
As for delay, legislatures could employ such devices as recess committees to
accelerate review of grant decisions when the legislatures are not in session. 63
Implementation problems are inevitable, but these problems can be solved if
legislatures and executives cooperate.
A far more serious problem is that legislative involvement might thwart the
objectives of federal grant programs through practices such as legislative
screening of grant applications to be submitted by executive branch agencies.
From a state perspective, such screening is within the legislature's role as
priority setter. The legislature can prevent the state's participation in the
program or attempt to mold the program by altering the application. 64 From
the legislature's point of view, potential federal-state conflicts over program
content should surface early, before long term commitments are made. 65
From a federal perspective, however, this may be undesirable; the objectives
of federal grant programs may be advanced by practices which avoid airing
potential conflicts at an early stage of the grant process. 66 By developing
programs during a period of low visibility, free from intense legislative
scrutiny, the state executive branch agency can build constituent support
through such techniques as advisory committees and citizen participation. By
60. E.g., Title I of the Local Public Works Capital Development and Investment Act of 1976, § 104,42
U.S.C. § 6703 (1976).
61. 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 116 (statement of John P. Mallan).
62. E.g., Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16, at 7.
63. See 1977 Hearing. supra note 6, at 105-06. But see State ex reL Judge v. Legislative Finance Comm.,
168 Mont. 470, 543 P.2d 1317 (1975).
64. The legislature can alter the application in hopes that the funds will be granted on the state's terms.
Of course, the grantor agency ultimately determines whether the application is consistent with the
underlying grant statute. If the application is not accepted, the state legislature may still be able to choose
to submit another application or to forego the funds.
65. It is no accident that legislators frequently say of a federally funded activity that they never would
have authorized it if they had known what was going on. See, e.g., 1977 Hearings, supra note 6, at 53-54
(statement of George Roberts, speaker, N.H. House of Representatives).
66. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
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the time the state is required to assume greater financial or other obligations,
lobbying force is available. 67
This argument has some appeal, at least as an accurate description of how
grant programs operate. Yet it is hard to accept when measured against a
normative concept of a federal system that relies heavily on the vitality of
state representative governments. Indeed, the very choice of the grant
mechanism as opposed to direct federal performance of a function suggests
that Congress preferred to implement the programs through the states' basic
institutional structure.
Greater state legislative involvement in federal grant decisions raises
difficult questions, the resolution of which may depend on whether one
approaches it from a state or federal perspective. Although Congress could
spell out the extent and limits of the legislative role in specific grant
programs, 68 it rarely mentions legislatures at all. Governors argue that this
pattern of omission evinces Congress' intent to restrict the legislative role;
legislators treat this "silence of Congress" as leaving the matter open. 69 Of
course, if state law operates to limit the legislative role in federal grants, it
might be unnecessary to reach any potential federal questions.
III. THE STATE LAW GROUNDS-INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE?
Most courts that have dealt with the issue have invalidated legislative
assertions of power over grant funds.70 Many courts reaching this result
purport to rely solely on state constitutional provisions such as separation of
powers without focusing on the federal nature of the funds.71 In at least two
cases, however, courts have formulated state constitutional doctrines dealing
specifically with federal funds.72 These decisions appear to be based largely on
the courts' perceptions of the federal grant-in-aid system, and may, in fact, be
disguised federal law holdings.
67. See 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 76.
68. See notes 182-201 & accompanying text infra for a discussion of possible constitutional limitations
on Congress' right to delineate the state legislative role.
69. See, e.g., 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 53.
70. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 71, 72 infra.
71. See, e.g., Opinion of The Justices, 369 Mass. 990, 341 N.E.2d 254 (1976), where the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court struck down the legislature's attempt to exercise a virtual veto power over the
hiring of new employees, including those in federally funded programs. Characterizing the attempt as an
incursion upon the executive's inherent power to select personnel, the court employed the traditional
separation of powers analysis to determine the constitutionality of the legislation and emphasized that its
holding applied to federally funded employees as well as others. Id. at 992-94, 341 N.E.2d at 256.
Similarly, other state courts have struck down or restricted the use of interim or recess legislative
committees to oversee the use of federal funds, not because federal funds per se were involved, but because
recourse to such committees violated state law doctrines against delegation of legislative power. E.g., State
ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Finance Comm., 168 Mont. 470, 543 P.2d 1317 (1975).
72. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972); Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. -,
378 N.E.2d 433 (1978).
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In the principal case, MacManus v. Love,73 Colorado senators challenged a
gubernatorial veto of a bill prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds
without legislative appropriation. In holding that the bill violated the
Colorado Constitution's separation of powers provision 74 and therefore was
"void as an infringement upon the executive function of administration, ' 75
the court found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether it conflicted
with federal grants statutes. 76 The court's reasoning is unpersuasive on two
grounds. First, the court merely characterized the expenditure of federal
funds as administrative without analyzing the procedures by which such
funds are obtained. The decision of whether to spend funds is a traditional
legislative function, related to its powers of budget preparation, oversight and
control.77 It is only after that decision is made that the executive is given the
power to decide the exact manner in which the funds are to be spent.
Second, the logical extension of the court's blanket statement that "federal
contributions are not the subject of the appropriative power of the legisla-
ture,"78 is that the legislature cannot act even when mandated to do so by
Congress as a precondition to receiving funds. Since it is unlikely that the
court intended to prevent Colorado's receipt of General Revenue Sharing
funds, 79 the nature of the grant program in question would seem controlling.
This would require the court to examine each federal statute under which
Colorado received funds to determine whether or not legislative appropria-
tion was permissible.8 0 The underlying question of what the legislature can do,
therefore, appears to be governed not by state law, but by congressional
intent.
Reaching a similar result to that in MacManus, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court focused on the nature of grant funds in an advisory
opinion on proposed legislation to subject all federal funds to legislative
appropriation. 8' In interpreting a constitutional provision requiring legislative
73. 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972).
74. COLO. CONsT. art. 3 provides that "[N]o person... charged with the exercise of powers belonging
to one of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others ....
75. 179 Colo. at 222, 499 P.2d at 611. Cf. Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 2d 550, 219
P.2d 457 (1950)(city council's approval of application for federal public housing funds not legislative but
properly exercised executive function).
76. 179 Colo. at 222, 499 P.2d at 611.
77. See, e.g., Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 469-70, 391 A.2d 595, 604-05 (1978), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
78. MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. at 222, 499 P.2d at 610.
79. 31 U.S.C. § 1243(a)(4) (1976) provides that revenue sharing funds are to be expended in the same
manner as the state's own revenue.
80. The court may have reasoned that legislative appropriation would make the state ineligible for
federal funds under some programs, and that therefore legislative action that deprives the state of federal
funds is invalid as a matter of state law. Nevertheless, this way of stating the problem does not avoid the
necessity of examining federal grant statutes to determine precisely what, as a matter of federal law, is
wrong with the legislative action in question.
81. Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. _ 378 N.E.2d 433, 436 (1978). The Massachusetts
Constitution authorizes advisory opinions on pending legislation. MASS. CONsT. art. 2, ch. 3.
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appropriation of all funds, the court declared that funds received in trust were
exempt from the provision and that federal funds were received in trust.82
Citing MacManus, the Court rationalized that by such action, the legislature
would be "interfering with the right and obligation of the executive to decide
the extent and manner of expending funds in performing its constitutional
duty faithfully to execute and administer the laws."' 83 The Massachusetts
court, however, did leave room for reaching a different conclusion by
acknowledging that not all federal money is received in trust.84 The court
recognized therefore, that the issues involved federal law but did not address
it.
On close analysis, these two courts seem to have accepted tacitly the
governors' contention that Congress intends to limit the state legislative role
in federal grant programs. Further, the courts may have been influenced by
the governors' argument that any legislative initiatives that run counter to
this intent are invalid under the supremacy clause because they violate federal
statutes. 85 Because the supremacy clause issue dominates much of the current
debate over the legal limits of state legislative involvement in federal grant
programs, it will be analyzed at this point. After analyzing what the effects of
a state legislature's "violation" of a federal grant statute might be, Section V
then suggests an approach courts should utilize to determine whether such a
violation exists.
IV. THE FEDERAL LAW ISSUES-A QUESTION OF NATIONAL
SUPREMACY?
A. "THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF NOT YIELDING"
According to traditional grant-in-aid theory, the supremacy clause has no
bearing on state legislative actions that run afoul of federal statutory
language. Under this theory, if a state does not comply with the terms of a
federal grant, it is not eligible to receive the funds. The Supreme Court cases
permitting the imposition of conditions upon the award of federal funds to
states86 reject the argument that a state's sovereignty is invaded; instead they
emphasize that a state may escape federal conditions that it considers
violative of its sovereignty by not accepting federal funds. 87 In Justice
82. Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. at -, 378 N.E.2d at 436.
83. Id. Such an analysis rests on a misreading-or more precisely a nonreading-of the federal grants
statutes.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16; 1977 Hearing, supra note 6, at 117
(statement of John P. Mallan).
86. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
87. The doctrine can be traced to Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Although purporting
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Sutherland's famous language, the state has "the simple expedient of not
yielding."88
It follows that if a state legislature acts inconsistently with the conditions
attached to receipt of federal funds, the state has chosen "not to yield" and
therefore is ineligible for the funds. Much of the escalating volume of grant-
in-aid litigation involves precisely this issue: whether funds should be
terminated or not awarded for grantee noncompliance with the conditions of
the underlying grant statute.89 Indeed, the Third Circuit has held that
ineligibility for funding is the only legal consequence that can follow from a
grantee's noncompliance with federal conditions. 90
Governors claim, however, that the issue must be approached from a
different perspective: the supremacy of federal law.91 They argue that
attempts to appropriate funds in a manner that is inconsistent with the
conditions of a federal grant statute violate federal law, and therefore, such
attempts are null and void under the supremacy clause.92 Governors contend
that because grant programs constitute an exercise of the federal spending
power, any state legislative attempt to impede a governor's compliance with
grant conditions is an interference with the exercise of federal power and
therefore has no effect. 93 Several bodies of case law can be cited in support of
this surprising proposition.
B. THE WELFARE CASES-KING v. SMITH AND ITS PROGENY
The governors have relied principally on cases in which welfare beneficia-
ries attacked state statutes or regulations affecting state participation in federal
income-transfer programs as inconsistent with the terms upon which the
assistance was granted. 94 The first such case, King v. Smith,95 challenged an
Alabama regulation 96 affecting aid to families with dependent children on
to hold that the state failed to present an actual case or controversy, id. at 480, the Court's decision can be
interpreted as validating the congressional imposition of conditions on federal grants. See id. at 479. Cf
Quern v. Mandley, 98 S. Ct. 2068, 2075 (1978) (states not required to participate in federal welfare
programs); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140 (1971)(local governments not required to accept funds
under Housing Act of 1937).
88. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482.
89. See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977).
90. PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1974). See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, GOVERNMENT
IN URBAN AREAS 1166 (1970).
91. See, e.g.. Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16, at 15-20.
92. This doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court holding in McCulloch v. Maryland, denying
states the power "to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional
laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
93. See Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16, at 16-17.
94. Such terms are contained either in the federal statute or implementing regulations.
95. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
96. ALA. MAN. FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI, cited in King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 314 n.8 (1968).
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grounds that it violated both the equal protection clause and the Social
Security Act.97 Finding a clear inconsistency between the Alabama regulation
and federal law, the Court struck down the regulation. 98 From the perspective
of federal grant program analysis, the significance of the decision is that the
Court did not order the termination of funds.99 The Court reasoned that
because -the federal government has the power to impose the terms and
conditions under which its money is allocated to a state, "any state law or
regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and conditions, is to that
extent invalid." 100
This conclusion is startling,101 and is questionable on several grounds.
First, the notion of invalidity runs counter to the fundamental tenet of grant-
in-aid doctrine that a state can elect not to accept the terms and conditions of
federal aid; if the state is out of compliance, it loses the aid. Second, because
the grantee is not required to participate in the program at all, the term
"imposed obligations" seems inaccurate; these obligations are binding only
because the parties have agreed upon a cooperative venture for a limited time
period. 102 Finally, the two precedents cited by Chief Justice Warren are not
strong support for invoking the supremacy clause. Oklahoma v. Civil Service
Commission,10 3 an early case upholding the practice of attaching grant
conditions, rejected Oklahoma's attack on those sections of the Hatch Act
that prohibit federally-funded state employees from engaging in political
activities. 104 Oklahoma claimed that the penalties imposed for noncompliance
invaded its state sovereignty 05 The Court, however, noting that the issue of
the federal government's power to compel the removal of a state employee
was not before it, held that Congress could dictate the terms upon which
federal funds were disbursed since state participation was voluntary.106
The second case, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 107 involved the
question whether the federal government could restrict the distribution of
97. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1976).
98. 392 U.S. at 334. The Alabama regulation defined "parent" as a person cohabitating with the
mother, even if infrequently and not in the home, and terminated AFDC funds if such a "substitute father"
existed. ALA. MAN. FOR ADMINISTRATION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I, ch. II, § VI, cited in 392 U.S.
309, 314 n.8. The Court stated that the federal law implied that funds could be terminated only if someone
other than the mother had a legal obligation to support the child. 392 U.S. at 327.
99. 392 U.S. at 333.
100. Id. at n.34. Chief Justice Warren emphasized that Alabama could not breach a "federally imposed
obligation." 392 U.S. at 333.
101. Willcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, 22 AD. L. REV. 125, 133 (1969).
102. See notes 129-39 & accompanying text infra. Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 427
(1970)(Douglas, J. concurring).
103. 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1976).
105. 330 U.S. at 142. Under § 12(b) of the Hatch Act, 4 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976), the Civil Service
Commission holds a hearing and if it so concludes, notifies a state agency that the violation warrants
removal of the employee. If the agency does not comply with the recommendation, an amount equal to
twice the annual compensation of the offending employee is withheld.
106. 330 U.S. 143.
107. 357 U.S. 275 (1958).
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water supplied by a joint federal-state irrigation project in contravention of
the state's statutorily endorsed doctrine of reasonable beneficial use. Revers-
ing the state supreme court, the Court held, as a matter of federal statutory
interpretation, that Congress did not intend to allow state law to govern the
point at issue.108 The supremacy clause was invoked only incidentally, as
support for the dicta that "a state cannot compel the use of federal property
on terms other than those prescribed or authorized by Congress."' 09 Thus,
Ivanhoe seems a weak precedent for the strong supremacy clause implications
of King v. Smith.
In the next major "welfare" case, Rosado v. Wyman, 110 the Court held that
the challenged New York regulations were incompatible with the federal
grant statute, and that declaratory and injunctive relief were appropriate; if
the state failed to develop a conforming plan, an injunction terminating
federal monies would be granted. "'1 The reference to federal monies suggests
that the Court was following traditional grant theory concerning the states'
ability to reject federal aid by not complying with federal statutes. Moreover,
in addressing the question of the appropriate remedy, Justice Harlan stated
that "the unarticulated premise [in King] was that the State had alternative
choices of assuming the additional cost of paying benefits to families with
substitute fathers or not using federal funds to pay welfare benefits according
to a plan that was inconsistent with federal requirements."'" 2 He went on,
however, to characterize the New York provisions as invalid, 113 an echo of the
supremacy clause implications of King.
The supremacy clause issue arose squarely in Townsend v. Swank,114 in
which plaintiffs challenged Illinois statutes and regulations that disqualified
children in college from AFDC eligibility. 15 The Court held that the state law
conflicted with the federal law which included college students in the
definition of eligible recipients; the state provisions, therefore, were "invalid
under the supremacy clause." ' 16 The Court based its decision directly on King
v. Smith 17 which, it said, established the principle that nonconforming
108, Id. at 293, At issue were two sections of the Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, §§ 5, 8, 32 Stat.
389-90 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 431, 383 (1976)). Section 5 prohibits the sale of water to tracts in excess of
160 acres and § 8 negatives Congress' intent to affect or interfere with state water laws. Although the
California Supreme Court held that § 8 is absolute and controls other sections of the Act, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that it applied only to the acquisition of water rights, not to the operation of federal
projects. 357 U.S. at 291.
109. 357 U.S. at 295. The court seemed influenced by the fact that the dam construction project was
nearing completion with nearly half a billion federal dollars already expended. 357 U.S. at 279-80.
Termination under such circumstances, therefore, was not a feasible alternative.
110. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
111. Id. at 420.
112. Id. at 420-21.
113. Id. at 421.
114. 404 U.S, 282 (1971).
115, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (1967).
116. 404 U.S. at 285.
117. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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statutes were invalid under the supremacy clause. 18 Chief Justice Burger's
concurring opinion is significant because he disagreed as to the effect of a
finding of conflict between state and federal laws. Rejecting the supremacy
clause analysis, he reasoned that since adherence to the federal statute is "not
mandatory under the supremacy clause," the only inquiry could be whether
the grantee was in conformity; if not, the state should be found ineligible for
federal funds.' 19
Notwithstanding the Chief Justice's caveat, the Court adhered to the
supremacy clause analysis one year later in Carleson v. Remillard.20 In
subsequent cases holding for plaintiffs the Court tended to characterize the
challenged state statute or regulation as "invalid" or "in conflict" with federal
law, rather than specifically invoking the supremacy clause. 121 In 1976,
however, the Court suggested the supremacy clause as an alternative ground
of decision on remand in Youakim v. Miller, 122 and recently affirmed the
summary judgment for the plaintiffs that resulted.123 This suggests that the
Court continues to adhere to the supremacy clause analysis.
At times, courts have referred to conflicts between state actions and
provisions of federal grant statutes as raising issues of federal preemption. 124
Such preemption occurs when the federal government forbids all state action
in a specific area. 125 Because the ability to preempt is derived from the
supremacy clause, references to preemption support a supremacy clause
analysis of grant litigation.
118. 404 U.S. at 286. Lower courts that find for plaintiffs in "welfare" cases frequently adhere to the
Townsend interpretation of King. See, e.g., Doe v. Rampton, 497 F.2d 1032 (10th Cir. 1974); Green v.
Barnes, 485 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1973); Lopez v. Vowell, 471 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 939
(1973); Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 421 U.S. 338 (1975). At least one
circuit judge has challenged this analysis, assuming that "California can still fold its hands under the decree
and let the federal grants be terminated. If that is not permissible, then I dissent." Bryant v. Carleson, 444
F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
119. 404 U.S. at 292 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
120. 406 U.S. 598 (1972). It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Burger concurred in the opinion and
judgment without objecting to the supremacy clause argument. Id. at 604 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
121. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); Shea v.
Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974).
122. 425 U.S. 231, 234-36 (1976) (per curiam).
123. Youakim v. Miller, 431 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977), afftd, 99
S. Ct. 957 (1979).
124. E.g., Ohio Dep't of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 482-89 (state disqualification
of involuntarily unemployed worker for unemployment compensation not preempted by federal law); New
York Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (federal Work Incentive Program does not
preempt state Work Rules); Park East Corp. v. Califano, 435 F. Supp. 46, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (federal
procedures for hospital closures preempt state procedures).
In New York Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, however, the Court noted that preemption was being
used "in a special sense," because the federal government was not attempting to supplant an independent
state program. 413 U.S. at 411 n.9.
125. The preemption doctrine essentially states that the hierarchical nature of the federal system
permits Congress to exclude the states from acting in areas in which Congress possesses plenary legislative
power. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 376-89 (1978).
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Judicial references to preemption and conflict, however, may be misplaced.
These doctrines arose in the context of the exercise of regulatory powers.
Courts have not addressed directly the issue of whether the regulatory
concepts of conflict and preemption should apply to exercises of the spending
power. From a conceptual standpoint, expenditure and conduct regulation
may well be viewed as alternative methods of resource allocation. Further-
more, the spending power has been declared a separate and independent
power of the national government, "limited only by the requirement that it
shall be exercised to provide for the general welfare of the United States."' 126
The analogy to commerce clause conflicts, however, is inappropriate when
applied to grant programs-the result of conflict ought to be ineligibility for
grant funds, not invalidity of the state legislation. 127
As for "preemption," the term is misleading when applied to grant
programs. The federal grant-in-aid programs represent a "cooperative"
venture in which each government shares a portion of the undertaking. The
federal government provides some or all of the financing, while the grantee is
largely responsible for program administration. If the national government
preempted the activity, no grant-in-aid relationship would exist. Although the
concept of the general welfare might be stretched to permit the national
government to carry out directly many of the spending and other functions
that are currently accomplished through the grant-in-aid programs, the
choice of the grant-in-aid mechanism represents a decision by the federal
government not to do so. Congress clearly does not want to prohibit all state
activity in these areas, which application of the preemption doctrine would
call for. It is not accurate or helpful, therefore, to analyze disputes between
the two "partners" as presenting questions of federal preemption of the state's
activity. 128
126. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936). In Butler, the government claimed that the
"voluntary" nature of the Agricultural Adjustment program removed constitutional impediments to
regulating local activity found in the Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922). The Court discounted this
argument stating that "[t]he farmer. . . may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the loss of
benefits. . . .The power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits is the power to coerce or destroy." 297
U.S. at 70-71. It should be noted that Butler was among the last cases decided before Roosevelt's
threatened court-packing scheme induced the Court to reverse its position on economic regulation. See,
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). For this reason, Butler has been discredited.
See, e.g., Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 807 n.13 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The
independence of the taxing and spending powers, however, remains intact.
127. See notes 86-90 & accompanying text supra.
128. In this context, the 1974 case of Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), is instructive. Parents of
Missouri nonpublic school children challenged that state's administration of Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act. They alleged that the state's refusal to provide the same on-the-premises
instruction to disadvantaged children in parochial schools as was provided under Title I funds to such
children in public schools violated the Act's "comparability" requirement. The state relied in part on a
provision of its constitution, which forbade payment "from any public fund whatever" to aid religious
schools. Mo. CON sT. art. 9, § 8. Looking to congressional intent, the Supreme Court held that the court of
appeals erred in characterizing the funds as federal and in concluding that federal law governed; Missouri
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C. THE ALTERNATIVE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-A CONTRACTUAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE WELFARE CASES
Despite language in some cases, the question of whether a grantee is in
compliance with the underlying federal statute need not result in only the two
alternatives of finding a state in compliance or ineligible for the funds. A
recent analysis of rights and remedies under grants-in-aid asserts that the
"award of a grant creates a relationship between grantor and grantee which is
contractual, not donative."' 29 In addition, an early land grant case, McGehee
v. Mathis,'30 concluded that acceptance of a land grant created a contract
which "was binding upon the state, and could not be violated by its legislation
without infringement of the Constitution."' 31 The clear implication of this
language and analysis is that a federal common law of contract binds the state
to live up to its agreement. 32 Recent cases such as Lau v. Nichols133 and
Wheeler v. Barrera134 support this view. Notwithstanding its earlier allusion
to the possibility of preemption, the Court in Barrera directed the district
court on remand to "assure that the state and local agencies fulfill their part
of the Title I contract if they choose to accept Title I funds.' ' 35
If one accepts this analysis, it follows that inconsistent state actions,
including actions of the legislature, can be invalidated during the term of the
grant because they violate the contract, 136 thereby requiring the state to meet
the federal conditions. Such specific performance of grant conditions is an
alternative to finding the state in noncompliance and terminating funds. 3 7 If
law was not to be preempted but accommodated. 417 U.S. at 416-19. Stressing that comparability did not
require identical programs, the opinion stated that if state law prevented on-the-premises instruction for
disadvantaged students in parochial schools, the state had three choices, it could make the Title I aid in
those schools comparable to that in public schools through some unspecified means, it could terminate on-
the-premises assistance currently given in public schools, or it could simply forfeit the opportunity to
participate in Title I. Id. at 423-26. Even though the Court suggested that Congress could have preempted
state law provisions, id. at 416, the result of the case seems more consistent with traditional grant-in-aid
theory than with supremacy clause analysis. If the state ultimately were found to be unwilling or unable to
comply with the conditions attached to the federal funds, it had "the simple expedient of not yielding,"
thereby foregoing its entitlement to those funds. See notes 86-90 & accompanying text supra.
129. Wallick & Montalto, Symbiosis or Domination: Rights and Remedies Under Grant-Type Assistance
Programs, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 165 (1978) (footnote omitted). Contra, Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa.
449, 472-73, 391 A.2d 595, 606 (1978) (grants not contracts but conditional gifts), appeal dismissed sub
nor. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
130. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 143 (1866).
131. Id. at 155. "All the elements of a contract met in the transaction-competent parties, proper
subject-matter, sufficient consideration, and consent of minds." Id.
132. It may well be that the supremacy clause gives this law of contract its binding effect, but the
governors do not base their supremacy clause argument on any theory of contract.
133. 414 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1974).
134. 417 U.S. 402, 427 (1974).
135. Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (federal grant agreement
characterized as contract).
136. "[F]rom the grantor's viewpoint, the purposes, terms, and conditions of a grant, if consistent with
the enabling statute, clearly are enforceable against the grantee, at least during the period and to the extent
that the grantee uses the funds." Wallick & Montalto, supra note 129, at 166-67.
137. Although specific performance generally is a disfavored remedy in contract litigation, some
FEDERAL GRANTS AND STATE LEGISLATURES
upheld by courts, specific performance is likely to be used frequently because
both beneficiaries and federal grantor agencies want to achieve program
objectives.l38
The results of the welfare cases can be harmonized with the contractual
rationale. In the welfare cases, invalidating the offending condition essentially
was a means of insuring that the state fulfilled its obligations until it
terminated the contract. 139 This analysis differs from that advanced by the
governors: the thrust of the supremacy clause argument is that legislatures
have no power to initiate state actions inconsistent with the terms of federal
grant statutes, while the contractual analysis suggests that such attempts may
be invalidated only during the term of outstanding grant contracts. The
importance of this distinction arises from the differing consequences. The
contractual rationale simply forbids the state to take inconsistent actions once
it has accepted the grant and is in a contract, while the supremacy clause
rationale invalidates all inconsistent state actions at any time during the
federal statute's existence.
D. THE IMPACT AID CASES AND CONCEPT OF "INTERFERENCE"
Governors have relied principally on the welfare cases to support their
position that legislative initiatives which interfere with the operation of
federal spending programs are invalid. 40 Another line of supremacy clause
cases, however, involving federal "impact aid" also has been cited for this
proposition. In 1950, Congress initiated a program of providing federal grants
to school districts in which the population of children was substantially
increased or local property tax bases decreased as a result of the federal
activities. 14t Conflict arose when some states adopted equalization formulas
commentators have concluded that it should be readily available in the grant context. See, e.g., Tomlinson
& Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary
Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 681-83 (1972).
138. Grantors could choose to suspend or terminate funds rather than to seek specific performance
under the federal statute. Because termination of funds would thwart rather than fulfill federal objectives
grantor agencies probably would prefer specific performance.
139. See United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (termination not exclusive
remedy). The contractual analysis presents some difficult problems of its own, including the question of
who acts for the state in contracting with the federal government. Logically, the contracting party for the
state must be the executive branch acting under express, implied, or apparent authority derived from the
constitution or legislature. Thus, for example, a legislature might be deemed to have "ratified" a grant
agreement by voting matching funds for the program. In such a case, specific performance would be an
appropriate remedy during the term of the contract since those acting for the state clearly had authority to
do so.
140. Brief of Governor Michael S. Dukakis, supra note 16, at 19-20.
141. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1976), "declares it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial
assistance . . . for those local educational agencies upon which the United States has placed financial
burdens .... Four bases of eligibility are stipulated: (1) reduction in revenue from local sources because
of federal acquisition of real property; (2) education of children who live on federal property; (3) education
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that took these federal subsidies into account in determining the amount of
state aid to be provided to "impacted areas."' 42 School districts and parents
successfully challenged the state formulas, primarily on supremacy clause
grounds.143 In ruling on these challenges, the courts employed the doctrine of
federal supremacy enunciated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 144 and reasoned that
the state statutes frustrated and impeded Congress' intent to supplement the
revenues available to such districts from all other sources. 145 ,
The cases have been criticized on the ground that the courts misread the
intent of Congress. 146 Commentators argue that Congress intended to "make
the districts whole" by compensating them for the loss of local tax revenues
and recognizing the additional burdens caused by the presence of extra
pupils. 147 They reason that a certain amount of equalization had already come
from federal sources, and that state formulas should be able to take this
equalization into account when calculating the comparative resources avail-
able to all school districts.14 The courts focused their analysis on whether the
state and federal efforts conflicted, and concluded that if they did, the
conflicting portions of the state aid statutes would be rendered invalid under
the supremacy clause. 149 Several lines of reasoning support this conclusion.
First, one might argue that impact aid is, in fact, a federal subsidy to
federal dependents that can be administered more effectively by supporting
local school districts than by operating separate schools or making payments
directly to families of government employees. Under such a theory, federal
of children whose parents work on federal property; and (4) a sudden and substantial increase in the school
population because of federal activities. In 1978, a commission was authorized to evaluate the program,
including an examination of the equity of the funding structure and a cost-benefit analysis. Education
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-561, Title X, § 1015, 92 Stat. 2311.
142. These distribution formulas attempt to compensate for inequalities among local school districts by
providing proportionately greater payments to districts with poorer revenue-raising capabilities.
143. Carlsbad Union School Dist. v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969), affd, 429 F.2d 337
(9th Cir. 1970); Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Neb. 1969); Hergemeter v. Hayden, 295 F.
Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1968); Douglas Indept. School Dist. v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849 (D.S.D. 1968);
Shepheard v. Goodwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
144. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819). See notes 91-93 & accompanying text supra.
145. The federal district court followed the same reasoning in Middletown School Comm. v. Board of
Regents, 439 F. Supp. 1122 (D.R.I. 1977), but held for the defendants saying that, "the Rhode Island
formula retains the supplementary character of Pub.L. 81-874 funds precisely as Congress intended, and
comports with the letter and spirit of Congressional intent." Id. at 1126.
146. See Note, The Dilemma of Federal Impact Area School Aid, 55 MINN. L. REv. 33, 43-54 (1970);
Recent Statutes-State Statute Interferring with Federal "Impact" Aid to Education is Unconstitutional, 82
HARV. L. REV. 702, 704-06 (1969).
147. The nature of the federal aid is compensatory rather than supplementary. The courts in the impact
aid cases erroneously imputed to Congress the intent to provide an extraordinary grant to impacted school
districts. Where a state had already augmented its aid to impacted areas because of increased need, the
deduction of state aid in response to federal assistance merely restored equality between impacted and
nonimpacted districts. The Dilemma of Federal Impact Area School Aid, supra note 146, at 43-47.
148. Id. at 48-52.
149. At least one commentator disagreed with the courts on the merits, but did not question their
supremacy clause analysis. Id. at 37-41.
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programs are advanced by such payments, 150 and state formulas that dilute or
eliminate the subsidies frustrate the will of Congress.
Second, one might contend that the equalization formulas involved
interfered with the relationship that Congress established between the
national government and such school districts. Under this view, Congress
intended to give these districts a "bonus." 151 In this sense, a district might be
regarded as analogous to a federal instrumentality.152 Thus, districts receiving
impact aid would be immune from any action by the state that affected their
financial relationships with the federal government. 153 The argument errs,
however, in analogizing local school districts to federal instrumentalities. The
districts are creatures of the state; American constitutional doctrine has
always accorded the states sweeping control over their political subdivi-
sions.154 The state is faced with a choice: it may forbid local acceptance of
federal impact aid,155 or it may permit acceptance, but only in a manner which
ensures that the aid effectuates congressional intent. An absolute bar to the
receipt of federal impact aid might be politically inexpedient. On the other
hand, the reduction of state aid in proportion to federal payments deprives the
latter of the "bonus" effect which this argument presumes they were intended
to have. Once the state chooses to permit acceptance of impact aid, the
frustration of the intended effect supports the conclusion that the supremacy
clause invalidates the state action.
150. Cf. Los Alamos School Bd. v. Wugalter, 557 F.2d 709, 714 (10th Cir. 1977). "Because the morale
ofproject-connected persons is essential to the common defense and security of the United States, Congress
found the federal government could not totally divorce itself from the new civilian communities. Therefore,
it authorized funds for assistance in operating the communities." Id. Note, however, that the court upheld
a state equalization funding formula that allowed fewer state funds to a school district receiving impact aid.
151. Douglas Indpt. School Dist. No. 3 v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849, 852 (D.S.D. 1968), stressed that
the funds were to be "given to the local districts and are meant to be distributed by the local districts
152. In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819), the Court treated the Bank of the
United States as a federal instrumentality, and protected it from state taxation.
153. Whether the state formulas did affect these relationships is a question separate from the legal result
of such interference.
154. E.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
155. See, e.g., Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338, (8th Cir. 1973), aff d, 417 U.S. 402 (1974). In this
case, the court of appeals concluded that a state could conceivably pass a law that prohibited the use of any
Title I funds in a private school, assuming such a law could survive a challenge on equal protection
grounds. As a result, the state would not be entitled to a Title I grant since it could not comply with the
statutory requirement that educationally deprived public and nonpublic school children receive compara-
ble services. The state then would have to choose between repeal of the law or denial of the economic
benefits of Title I to its educationally-deprived children. 475 F.2d at 1352.
But see Alabama NAACP Conference of Branches v. Wallace, 269 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
Assurances of compliance with § 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by local school boards are a
prerequisite to federal financial assistance. A state statute barring the giving of such assurances precludes
compliance and conflicts with the policies embodied in the Act. Because the state statute is an effort to
frustrate the operation ofthe federal statute, the former must fall under the supremacy clause. 269 F. Supp.
at 349.
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Several courts have viewed the state action as a "diversion" of federal funds
from their original purpose. 156 Congress intended to provide direct aid to
federally impacted local school districts; instead, the state aid formula
resulted in a form of general aid to the state. 157 The courts reasoned that the
basic state formula was designed to increase by a certain amount funds
available to localities from their own revenue sources. Upon discovering that
an impacted district was already receiving a portion of that increase from the
federal government, the state "diverted" those federal funds by reducing its
intended contribution and by using the now available state funds for other
purposes. Congress did not enact the impact program to help ease the burden
on states but to provide compensatory relief to impacted localities above and
beyond their ordinary share of state aid.158
If one accepts the courts' statutory interpretation, invocation of the
supremacy clause to invalidate the state statutes seems correct. The argument
for invalidation in impact aid cases is strengthened by the lack of judicial
control over funds. Courts could not order recipients to terminate misuse of
the aid or to forfeit it, because the state, not the recipients, allegedly violated
the terms of the statute. 159 Thus, the traditional remedy of withholding or
terminating aid from a noncomplying grantee was not available in the impact
cases. Courts therefore may have been more willing to invalidate the state
statutes since there were no other means to effectuate Congress' purpose.
Although this lack of alternatives supports invalidation in the impact cases,
it dilutes their value as support for invalidating state statutes that conflict
with a grant to a state government, because the alternative of withholding aid
is feasible. In other words, invoking the supremacy clause may not be
necessary when the state is both the violator and the recipient. In sum,
although these cases are another example of supremacy clause analysis in the
context of grants-in-aid, the courts viewed the state legislation as interfering
with federal-local relationships. Consequently, this focus may diminish the
precedential value of these cases in the area of federal-state relationships.
E. THE FEDERAL LICENSEE CASES-ENDOWING CREATURES OF THE STATE
WITH FEDERAL AUTHORITY GREATER THAN THAT POSSESSED UNDER
STATE LAW
Federal courts of appeals have held that municipal corporations operating
facilities, such as dams and airports, licensed and regulated by federal
156. E.g., Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Neb. 1969).
157. Id. at 1245.
158. The "diversion" analysis may be simply a restatement of the "subsidy" and "bonus" arguments
already made as to why such state formulas violate the supremacy clause. See notes 150-55 &
accompanying text supra.
159. Congress appears to have recognized this fact by amending the statute-impact funds must be
withheld from localities in states that include such payments in their state aid formulas. Act of Oct. 16,
1968, § 203(c)(4), 20 U.S.C. § 240(d)(2) (1976). See Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (D. Neb.
1969).
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agencies can perform acts beyond the authority of municipalities under state
law. 160 The most famous case, State of Washington Department of Game v.
FPC,161 involved a challenge to the Federal Power Commission's grant of a
license to the city of Tacoma to construct a dam. The challengers attacked the
issuance of the license on the grounds that the city had failed to obtain the
necessary approval from state officials and that the dam would exceed
maximum heights for such structures set by state law. 162 Emphasizing that
Tacoma was a creature of the state, plaintiffs argued that the city could not
act "in opposition to the policy of the state or in derogation of its laws." 163
The Ninth Circuit rejected the proposition that the state statute could control
a federal licensee's conduct or bar the city's construction of a dam on a stream
that the federal government had the power to regulate. 164
Although the governors have not relied on this litigation, the licensee
decisions may be seen as providing some support for their position, because
they establish that the federal government can confer greater powers upon
municipal corporations than exist under state law. Arguably, therefore,
Congress also can confer such powers upon governors. In that event,
governors might be granted appropriation powers that are unauthorized or
even expressly forbidden to them under state law. 65
Nevertheless, a number of factors caution against such a broad reading.
First, in rejecting a subsequent collateral attack on Tacoma's operation of the
dam, the Supreme Court emphasized that state law gave the city the basic
authority to operate an electric utility system. 166 If a municipal corporation
totally lacks state authority to operate a particular type of facility, therefore, a
federal agency cannot confer such a power on it; if authorized by state law to
run the facility, it must be endowed with all the powers of any other
licensee.167
Second, the licensee cases were decided prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery. 168 The consequence of the
independent sovereignty doctrine enunciated in National League of Cities is
that Congress, even in the exercise of the otherwise plenary commerce power,
160. E.g., United States v. City of New Haven, 447 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1971); Public Utility District No.
I v. FPC, 308 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963).
161. 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
162. 207 F.2d at 395.
163. Id. at 396.
164. Id. The court did note, however, that there might be limitations in the city charter, such as a
limitation on indebtedness, which would bear on the legal capacity of the city to act under the license. Id.
165. In fact, one governor has referred to a federal grant statute as "vesting" state executive branch
agencies with power to implement the grant program. Brief for Appellants in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss at 7, Shapp v. Casey, appeal filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
166. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 328 (1958).
167. Cf Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)(state courts may not discriminate against federal law claim
when they would hear analogous claim based on state law).
168. 426 U.S. 823 (1976).
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cannot regulate states in the same manner that it can regulate individual
businesses. 169 A broad reading of National League of Cities suggests that if
the relationship between the state and its municipal corporations
constitutes one of the essential attributes of "state sovereignty," federal
schemes that disrupt that relationship transgress the limitations on the
exercise of federal power.
The claims of national supremacy are stronger in a regulatory context,
however, than in the partnership context of joint federal-state spending
programs. As noted above, a commerce clause analysis is based on the
premise that the exercise of federal power can act to "displace" state power
totally;170 this hierarchical notion is difficult to apply to the typical grant-in-
aid context. Compliance with state law in the Tacoma litigation would have
prevented the construction of a facility in the manner which Congress,
through its delegate, had properly authorized. With a grant system, however,
the possibility of frustrating the will of Congress is inherent because a state
has the option of refusing a grant and forbidding local governments from
participating in grant programs. This risk is acknowledged and accepted by
Congress when it chooses the grant mechanism. Thus, the licensee cases are of
limited value to the governors' argument that legislative attempts to share
power over federal grants-in-aid are invalid.
V. RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE LEGISLATIVE
INITIATIVES AND FEDERAL LAw-A SUGGESTED APPROACH
The analysis thus far can be summarized as follows: first, state legislative
assertions of authority over federal grants are not necessarily inconsistent
with the policies and goals of the federal grant system; and, second, even if in a
particular case such an assertion conflicts with a federal grant statute, the
result is not that the state legislative action is null and void, but that the state
must forego the funds if the legislature is unwilling to repeal or amend the
conflicting provision. 171
Courts need a general approach for resolving purported conflicts between
state legislative initiatives and federal grant statutes. In developing such an
approach, construing federal legislation will be difficult since most grant
statutes are silent about the legislative role, even when they delineate the
executive role. Three principles of statutory construction, derived from the
nature and values of the federal system, are relevant in construing the
legislation. All operate in favor of legislative authority.
169. Id. at 845.
170. See text at notes 124-27 supra.
171. See notes 86-90 & accompanying text supra.
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A. THE PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY OF STATE STATUTES
The question of whether state legislation is inconsistent with congressional
enactments arises frequently. The Supreme Court has stressed that this issue
should be approached with a desire to harmonize the statutes, and that a
finding of conflict between federal and state law should be avoided. 7 2 Justice
Brennan has explained "the Court's reluctance to interpret legislation to alter
the federal-state balance of power" as a "traditional canon of construction in
the face of statutory ambiguity that recognizes a presumption that Congress
normally considers effects on federalism before taking action displacing state
authority."' 73 This concern is one example of the clear statement rule, by
which state legislation is upheld unless Congress explicitly declares its intent
to displace state choices. 74
The federal-state conflicts which the Court has attempted to harmonize
usually are in the area of regulation. A finding of conflict results in invoking
the supremacy clause to strike down legislation enacted by a sovereign state.
In the grant-in-aid context, such a finding may lead only to the loss of a given
amount of federal funds rather than invalidation of the state statute.
Notwithstanding this different result, however, the traditional conflict ap-
proach of harmonizing the statutes should be followed in the grant cases as
well as in the regulatory area. It reflects a value judgment that the federal
government does not wish to overturn state choices, given the importance of
the states as vital units of a federal system. Because threat of aid withdrawal
clearly influences and may determine a state's action, the "effects on
federalism" rationale should create a presumption of validity for state
statutes.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF DEFERENCE TO STATE DECISIONS IN GRANT
PROGRAMS
Just as the Court developed the "presumption against preemption" and
corollary approaches to commerce clause litigation, the Court may be
172. See, eg., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 357 (1976)(section 2805(a) of the California Labor Code,
which prohibits employers from knowingly hiring illegal aliens if such employment would adversely affect
lawful resident workers, held not to be unconstitutional as a regulation of immigration or as preempted
under the supremacy clause by the Immigration and Nationality Act). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). In Merrill Lynch, the Court emphasized that "[o]ur
analysis is tempered by the conviction that the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both
statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.' "Id. at 127 (quoting Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
173, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 858 n.2 (1976)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971)(where statute is ambiguous, Court assumes
congressional intent not to diminish state power); L. TRIBE, supra note 125, at 243. Professor Tribe stresses
that "[a] rule like the clear statement requirement is ... essential: Congress must be prevented from
resorting to ambiguity as a cloak for its failure to accommodate the competing interests bearing on the
federal-state balance." Id. at 244.
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developing an analogous canon of construction to deal with the increasing
volume175 of grant-in-aid litigation. This canon can be stated as the presump-
tion that Congress, in enacting grant programs, intended that individual
states should retain some latitude in expending the funds. One case that
supports the existence of such a canon is New York Department of Social
Services v. Dublino.176 In resolving an asserted conflict between state work
rules and the Federal Work Incentive Program, the Court invoked federalist
values when it stressed the need for deference to state choices in the
expenditure of welfare grant funds. 77 This approach is consistent with the
traditional grant-in-aid premise that Congress has consciously chosen to
enlist the states as partners in expenditure programs rather than to administer
them solely on a national basis. Some variety in program operation among the
states is inevitable, therefore, and should be encouraged, given the need to
preserve the states as independent entities.
A slightly different, although complementary, rationale for such an
approach to statutory construction in grant litigation was elucidated recently
by the Supreme Court. In Batterton v. Francis,178 the Court upheld an HEW
regulation that granted states considerable latitude in defining unemployment
for purposes of a particular income transfer program, despite legislative
history that pointed strongly in the other direction. 79 The Court reasoned
that Congress wanted states to participate in the program, and that they
would be more likely to do so if the program gave them flexibility. 180 Thus, in
addition to the notion that Congress takes the states "as it finds them," there
is the additional argument that a presumption in favor of state latitude will
encourage participation in grant programs, thereby advancing the basic
congressional intent.18 1
C. CONSTRUING FEDERAL STATUTES TO UPHOLD THEIR VALIDITY: STATE
SOVEREIGNTY AS A PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRUCTION
The Supreme Court frequently twists federal statutory language to avoid a
literal interpretation that would render the statute violative of a constitutional
175. Professors Michelman and Sandalow state that "there has been a veritable explosion of cases
involving claims that private rights have been violated by the failure of a state or local grantee to comply
with requirements established by Congress in grant-in-aid statutes." F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW,
GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 275 (Supp. 1972).
176. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
177. "The problems confronting our society in these areas are severe, and the state governments in
cooperation with the Federal Government must be allowed considerable latitude in attempting their
resolution." Id. at 413.
178. 432 U.S. 416 (1977).
179. Id. at 430-32 (citing S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 160 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 544.
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 17, 108 (1967); 113 CONG. REc. 32592 (1967)(remarks of Sen. Long)).
180. Id. at 431-32.
181. This argument assumes that states would be willing to forego funds from at least some grant
programs if they were not given some control. If the state is dependent on the aid, it may well succumb to
Congress' conditions. See notes 194-96 & accompanying text infra.
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limitation on the power of Congress.182 Such cases have arisen in the context
of potential clashes between federal legislation and constitutional guarantees
that protect individuals. National League of Cities v. Usery, 183 however, makes
it clear that the concept of state sovereignty, rooted in principles of
federalism, is a limitation on Congress' powers also when dealing with states.
Although National League of Cities struck down federal legislation, at least
two circuit courts have utilized the decision as a guide to statutory construc-
tion in upholding congressional action.184 These courts reasoned that if one
construction would bring a federal statute into conflict with state sovereignty
limitations, courts should seek a permissible alternative construction that
does not run afoul of the limitations. They apply a second clear statement
technique, that of avoiding judicial inquiry into the limits of congressional
authority by assuming that Congress always intends to act within those
limits. 8 5
The circuit courts were grappling with the same underlying issue present in
National League of Cities-an asserted conflict between state sovereignty and
exercise of federal regulatory power. It is uncertain whether state sovereignty
limitations apply to grants-in-aid. 8 6 Congress may well be able to impose any
conditions it chooses upon receipt of federal funds by state and local
governments, as long as these conditions are related to the purpose of the
grant program or some other valid, national purpose. Under this view, state
sovereignty could never be invaded by a grant because the state always has the
alternative of not accepting the funds at all. This was the position taken by the
district court in North Carolina v. Califano 87 which upheld the federal
requirement of certificates of need for new health care facilities as a condition
to federal financial assistance for health programs. The Supreme Court's
summary affirmance of the decision'88 lends added support to the argument
that state sovereignty is not a limitation on the imposition of grant conditions.
182. "Examples are legion where literalness in statutory language is out of harmony . . . with
constitutional requirements." Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 238 (1968).
In Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), for example, the Court avoided the constitutional issue of the
national government's ability to deny passports to individuals who might be Communists. Despite strong
legislative history to the contrary, it held that the Secretary of State lacked statutory authority to deny
passports under the circumstances. Id. at 129-30.
183. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
184. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 226-27 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99
(1977) (per curiam); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 831 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 99
(1977) (per curiam). The Court refused to review these judgments invalidating transportation control plan
regulations promulgated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act and imposed on various states as elements of
an implementation plan where the federal parties conceded that the regulations remaining in controversy
were invalid unless modified.
185. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1206-07 (1977). See notes 172-74 & accompanying
text supra.
186. Several commentators have concluded that it does not. See, e.g., Wallick & Montalto, supra note
129, at 170-72.
187. 455 F. Supp. 532 (D.N.C. 1977), affd, 98 S. Ct. 1597 (1978).
188. North Carolina v. Califano, 98 S. Ct. 1597 (1978)(mem.).
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The language of National League of Cities is ambiguous on this issue. 189
The spirit of the decision, however, definitely suggests that the concept of
state sovereignty could apply in the grant context. 190 Even though the
regulations at issue in that case were mandatory while grants-in-aid are
theoretically voluntary, onerous grant requirements may in fact interfere with
attributes of state sovereignty that "may not be impaired by Congress
. . .. " 191 This leads to the conclusion that there may be state sovereignty
limitations upon the imposition of federal grant conditions. If so, courts must
determine whether those limitations have been exceeded. One commentator
has noted that "[i]f National League of Cities is interpreted as establishing a
balancing test weighing the relative importance of the federal interest against
the strength of the state's interest in autonomy, then in extreme cases the
balance may swing against federal grants-in-aid that impose conditions
subverting the independence of state legislatures." 192 It is unclear whether the
size or nature 93 of a grant should be a factor in the application of any such
balancing test. The landmark decisions on the spending power indicate that at
some point the threatened loss of federal funds can become so unattractive as
to constitute coercion. 194 Certainly a state's loss of millions of dollars in
revenue sharing funds for failure to observe a particular organizational
condition might be viewed as a far greater impairment of its sovereignty than
189. Justice Brennan's dissent appears to take as given that Congress could attach as conditions to
grants, the very wage and overtime standards that National League of Cities struck down in mandatory
form. 426 U.S. at 856-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plurality, in a footnote, expressed "no view as to
whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments
by exercising authority granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the Spending Power,
Article I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 852, n.17. It seems likely that the plurality
recognized the drastic nature of striking down federal legislation on what appeared to be tenth amendment
grounds and wished to signal the holding's limited applicability. Accordingly, several lower courts have
interpreted National League of Cities narrowly and concluded that it has no impact upon congressional
power to attach conditions to federal grants given to other units of governments. See, e.g., Florida v.
Mathews, 526 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1976)(state electing to participate in the medicaid program must comply
with federal standards; such compliance not an infringement upon state's tenth amendment powers); City
of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977)(once a municipality chooses to participate in
federally funded program, it must comply with federal statute).
190. The reason the Court found the wage and hour requirements to "interfere" with state sovereignty
was that they would "significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee
relationships. ... 426 U.S. at 851. Grant conditions can also alter or displace the states' abilities to
structure relationships.
191. Id. at 845 (emphasis added). The prospect of losing funds upon which the state had been relying to
balance its budget might well be as effective as coercive legislation in forcing the state to make choices. Of
course, it is also necessary that the subject matter of a particular choice involve an "attribute of state
sovereignty." Decisions about the allocation of power between governors and legislators would seem to be
well within this admittedly undefined category.
192. Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 271, 293-94 (1976).
193. Grants can range from a one-time project grant to ongoing formula entitlement funds.
194. See, e.g., Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-91 (1937). In this early case involving
the tax imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Act, the Court held that every rebate from a tax, when
conditioned upon conduct, is a temptation. Although Steward Machine Co. stresses that motive or
temptation is not the equivalent of coercion, the Court seems to recognize that, at some point, pressure
upon the state by the national government constitutes compulsion.
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ineligibility for a $100,000 planning grant based on the same organizational
condition.1 95
On the other hand, the balancing formulation suggests that only the nature
of the condition is relevant. As Professor Richard Stewart of the Harvard
Law School points out, it may not be helpful to engage in inquiry of coercion
vel non; rather, courts should inquire whether federal grant conditions
"unduly compromise a normative political conception of state autonomy" 196
because of tremendous pressure on states to reduce the burden on their own
resources by accepting federal grants. Whichever approach one takes, the
nature of the condition is obviously a key variable.
Grant conditions that explicitly favor governors and exclude state legisla-
tures are especially problematic when considering state sovereignty limita-
tions. Although Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission197
involved the activities of state officials in local politics, the Court upheld
federal grant conditions prohibiting such activities.198 One commentator
concluded that "conditions reasonably related to the purposes of federal
spending programs will not be invalidated unless they impose quite extreme
or unusual constraints on the structure of state government."' 199 Still, attempts
by Congress to alter the internal state balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches do impose such constraints and present serious state
sovereignty issues. National League of Cities v. Usery200 may provide grounds
for construing federal grant statutes so as not to preclude legislative assertion
of prerogatives. 20'
195, See Comment, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implications of National League
of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 726, 743-45 (1977).
196. Stewart, supra note 185, at 1254. Certainly the intensity with which regional spokesmen have
battled for changes in major grant formulas is evidence of the perceived importance of those funds to the
jurisdictions they represent. See, e.g., Peirce & Hagstrom, Regional Groups Talk About Cooperation But
They Continue to Feud, 10 NAT'L. J. 844 (1978). Another illustration of the attractiveness of federal funds
is the fact that although the Coastal Zone Management Program obviously contained the potential for
great controversy at the state and local levels, 33 of the 34 coastal states and territories were reported to be
participating at the close of 1976. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
ACTIVITIES 1975-1976 at 1 (1976).
197. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). In this case, a member of the State Highway Commission of Oklahoma,
whose position was financed in part by loans and grants from a federal agency, served, at the same time, as
Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. The Civil Service Commission determined that his
political activities violated § 12 of the Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. § 611 (1976), and warranted his removal from
the Highway Commission. See notes 103-06 & accompanying text supra.
198. 330 U.S. at 142-44.
199. Stewart, supra note 185, at 1256.
200. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
201. See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 469-72, 391 A.2d 595, 604-06 (1978) (supremacy clause and
federal statutes do not preclude legislature from requiring that all federal funds be deposited in the general
fund and be available for appropriation by the general assembly), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v.
Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979); Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. _, 381 A.2d 1204, 1210-11
(19 78)(supremacy clause and Public Health Service Act do not preclude legislature from requiring the
governor to designate the agency to receive federal health funds).
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VI. FEDERAL LAW CHALLENGES TO LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES: Two
EXAMPLES.
This article provides a general framework for analysis of the federal law
questions that specific legislative assertions of power may present. These
questions will arise in a large number of contexts; state initiatives will take
various forms and apply to hundreds of different federal grant statutes. Two
recent cases upholding legislative assertions of power over federal programs
appear to represent the most extensive consideration of the federal law issues
to date. Moreover, they are excellent illustrations of conflicts between
legislatures and governors that grant programs foment.
A. APPROPRIATION OF GRANT FUNDS: SHAPP V. SLOAN
In 1976, the Pennsylvania General Assembly sharply altered its practice of
pro forma approval of federal grant funds.20 2 by passing sweeping legislation
that required the specific appropriation of federal funds and prohibited their
disbursement by the state treasurer without an express appropriation. 203 It
then authorized several hundred "line appropriations" of grant funds204 but
refused to appropriate LEAA funds for a special prosecutor; the state
treasurer, therefore, refused to disburse them.205 In response, the Governor
and other executive branch officials sued the treasurer, claiming that the
refusal to fund the special prosecutor violated the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act.206 They further challenged the entire scheme of
legislative appropriation of grant funds on both state and federal constitu-
tional grounds. 207
Unlike the Colorado Supreme Court in MacManus v. Love,20 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the power of appropriating federal funds was
The New Hampshire Supreme Court went so far as to state that "if the General Court were interdicted
from assigning the regulatory responsibility for health care to its chosen agency, the Federal Act would be
in conflict with the policies underlying the tenth amendment to the Constitution." Opinion of the Justices.
- N.H. -, 381 A.2d 1204, 1210 (citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976))
202. Appropriations acts simply contained general boilerplate provisions accepting federal funds and
"appropriating" them to state agencies for the purposes designated. See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449,
458-59, 391 A.2d 595, 599 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
203. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4611-4617 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), cited in Shapp v. Sloan,
480 Pa. at 460-62, 391 A.2d at 600-01.
204. Federal Augmentation Appropriation Act, 1976 PA. LAWS 1383.
205. Pennsylvania had received a grant from the LEAA to fund an office of special prosecutor. This
grant appears to have been received as a component of the state's annual "block grant," rather than as a
discretionary grant from the federal agency. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 13, Shapp v.
Casey, appeal filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1978), appeal dismissed sub noma. Thornburgh v.
Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
206. Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 458, 391 A.2d 595, 599 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nor.
Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
207. Id.
208. 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972). See text accompanying notes 73-76 supra. In MacManus.
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clearly within the constitutional prerogatives of the state legislature. 20 9
Although the Court did consider the federal law issues, it relied more on
general views of federalism than on the specific language of the Safe Streets
Act. The Court simply stated that "[n]othing in the federal legislation
pursuant to which. . . funds are granted suggests that the same principles by
which programs wholly state funded are operated are inapplicable to
programs for which federal funds are supplied." 210
The legal question of whether the legislature's actions conflict with the
Safe Streets Act is a close one. Assuming a position directly opposed to that of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, LEAA has ruled that legislatures cannot
appropriate on a project-by-project basis if this practice includes the right to
disapprove items in a federally approved plan.21' Both the language and the
legislative history of the Act, however, leave congressional intent in doubt.
The language requiring matching funds to be appropriated "in the
aggregate" is inconclusive as to line-item approval of individual components
of a state plan. 212 Far more difficult problems are raised by the 1976
amendment that provides for advisory review by state legislatures of the
state's criminal justice plan prior to submission to the grantor agency.213 As
legislators challenged the governor's veto of a bill subjecting all federal funds to legislative appropriation.
179 Colo. at 220,499 P.2d at 609. In Shapp, the governor challenged a similar bill, passed over his veto. 480
Pa. at 460, 391 A.2d at 600.
209, 480 Pa. at 465, 391 A.2d at 602. Construing PA. CONST. art. Ill, § 24, the court declared: "The
constitution says 'no money' shall be paid without an appropriation. We think the constitution means
exactly what it says." 480 Pa. at 467, 391 A.2d at 603.
210. 480 Pa. at 469, 391 A.2d at 604. Shapp is the proverbial "hard case." The facts suggest strongly
that the legislature was more concerned with stopping an investigation into political corruption than with
overall priorities within the criminal justice system, Failure to appropriate the funds for a special
prosecutor, in fact, resulted in the termination of the grand jury that had initiated such an investigation. Id.
at 479-81, 391 A.2d at 610 (dissenting opinion).
211. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, LEGAL OPINIONS OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL 309 (1977)tLegal Opinion No. 77-5, Aug. 13, 1976). LEAA has relied primarily on language in
the Act referring to the state planning agency as "subject to the jurisdiction of the chief executive." 42
U,S.C. § 3723(a)(1) (1976). In addition, the Act refers to the state planning agency as the entity that
administers the federal grant and makes grants. Id. at §3733(a)(1). Congress, therefore, may have intended
to deal directly and exclusively with an executive branch agency in all facets of the expenditure of Safe
Streets Act funds except for the advisory review and the appropriation of matching funds. Id. §§ 3726,
3733(a)(2) (1976).
In Youakim v. Miller, the Supreme Court reiterated that "[t]he interpretation of a statute by an agency
charged with its enforcement is a substantial factor to be considered in construing the statute." 425 U.S.
231, 235 (1976).
212. The Act specifies that "the non-Federal funding of the cost of any program or project to be funded
by a grant under this section shall be of money appropriated in the aggregate, by State or individual units of
government, for the purpose of the shared funding of such programs or projects." 42 U.S.C. § 373 1(c)
(1976) (emphasis added). This language supports the reasoning that Congress was willing to give state
legislatures only one, all-or-nothing decision on state participation, rather than a project-by-project review.
The legislative history suggests, however, that Congress was concerned primarily with sparing grantees the
need to show that a 10% matching appropriation was made "for each and every of its programs and
projects." H.R. REP. No. 249, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEWS,
1729, 1732. It does not follow that Congress wished to preclude such a showing ifa state wanted to make it.
213. Pub. L. No. 94-503, Title I, § 108, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3726 (1977).
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:279
discussed above,214 there is strong legislative history indicating that Congress
was authorizing only an advisory review of the plan.215 Neither the Act nor the
legislative history, however, specifies how to reconcile the apparent conflict
between the advisory review and the power to appropriate matching funds. If
the legislature can appropriate matching funds on a project-by-project basis,
then its role is dispositive, not advisory, at least in so far as the ability to veto
projects is concerned.
Under the analysis developed in Section V, the result in Shapp seems
correct unless the legislature had taken some action which could be deemed a
"ratification" of the state plan prior to its refusal to appropriate the LEAA
funds.216 The Safe Streets Act is ambiguous as to the legislative role, and even
the legislative history indicating a limited role is insufficient to overcome the
first clear statement requirement, that Congress must explicitly declare its
intent to displace state choices.
The Governor of Pennsylvania argued that the Act "vests" the federal
spending power solely in the executive branch.217 This argument, however,
may trigger the second clear statement requirement, based on state sovereign-
ty limitations. Utilization of the grant system to deny state legislatures the
power to determine criminal justice priorities might well be the "extreme
case" of an invalid grant condition. 218 It seems preferable, therefore, to
construe the Act as permitting legislative appropriation of LEAA funds on a
line-item basis in those states where legislatures are sufficiently concerned
with federal funds to assert the power to do so.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the opportunity to resolve the
issues raised in this article when it dismissed the Pennsylvania appeal "for
want of a substantial federal question." 2 19 Unlike a denial of a petition for
certiorari, such dismissals "carry the same practical consequences as summa-
ry affirmances. The dismissal operates as an adjudication that the federal
question was properly decided on the merits by the state court. It carries the
stare decisis effect of binding state courts and lower federal courts .... "220
214. See notes 54-59 & accompanying text supra.
215. S. REP. No. 587, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 36-37, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5374, 5381-82, 5402.
216. If, for example, the legislature had exercised some review of the criminal justice plan prior to its
submission, as was later authorized by Congress, and did not indicate its disapproval of the special
prosecutor, this might be deemed a ratification.
217. See Shapp v. Sloan, 480 Pa. 449 at 463-64, 391 A.2d at 602.
218. See text accompanying note 192 supra.
219. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979) (mem.). 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976) provides for
mandatory Supreme Court review of final judgments of the highest state court in which decision could be
had "where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to
the Constitution . . .or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity."
220. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER, & E. GRESSMAN, 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
631 (1977).
FEDERAL GRANTS AND STATE LEGISLATURES
Although there is sharp and frequent criticism of this rule,22' the Court's
recent reaffirmation of it in Hicks v. Miranda222 would seem to entitle the
legislative side to claim total victory in Shapp. A close examination of the
case's progress in the Supreme Court, however, suggests that the issues raised
in Shapp remain open. In a brief submitted at the Court's invitation, the
Solicitor General of the United States urged dismissal of the appeal "for want
of a substantial federal question," 223 but not on the ground that the
Pennsylvania statute was valid. In fact, the brief acknowledged that there are
strong arguments both in favor of and against validity.224 The Solicitor
General argued instead that any inconsistency between the Pennsylvania
statute and Title I would simply render the state ineligible for funds.225
The brief insisted that the questions raised in Shapp remained open, and
that they might, in the future, come before the Court in a "proper" case such
as a challenge to a federal agency's refusal to make a grant. 226 Given the
unequivocal language in Hicks, it is highly unlikely that state and lower
federal courts will undertake the task of scrutinizing the papers filed in Shapp.
Thus, the case may well stand as a disposition on the merits in favor of state
legislatures.
B. DESIGNATING THE GRANTEE AGENCY: OPINION OF THE JUSTICES
Apart from programmatic conflicts exemplified by the appropriation issue,
federal grant programs also create what might be called structural conflicts
over the selection of a state agency to administer a particular grant program,
and the organization of that agency. Traditionally, the allocation of functions
among agencies, and related questions, such as the composition of each
agency, have been determined primarily by the legislature. A number of
federal grant statutes, however, specify that the funds are to be administered
by an agency "designated by the governor." When the legislature and
governor disagree over the choice of an agency, a classic conflict arises. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire recently had to resolve this issue.
221. One argument is that such cases do not receive scrutiny by the Court adequate to carry the same
precedential weight as cases that are argued and decided. See Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833, 836 (4th
Cir. 1975)(Clark, J., concurring). See also Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76
COLuM. L. REV. 508, 526-27 (1976). A second objection is that the Court uses the dismissal technique as a
discretionary screening device analogous to certiorari. Id. at 518-19, 533.
222. 422 US. 332 (1975). The Court bases this rule on the fact that jurisdiction is obligatory, not
discretionary, when state courts uphold the federal constitutionality of state laws. See note 219 supra. In
Hicks. Justice White insisted that in such cases, the Court must and does deal with the merits. 422 U.S. at
343-44.
223. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Shapp v. Casey, appealfiled, 47 U.S.L.W. 3302
(U.S. Oct. 31, 1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Thorburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979).
224. Id. at 15-18.
225. Id. at 18-19.
226. Id. at 19-20 n.17.
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The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974
provides that federal grants are to be awarded to a state health planning and
development agency selected by the governor.227 The Governor of New
Hampshire originally designated his own office. Then he designated the
state's Department of Health and Welfare. Finally, by executive order, he
took back the authority for administering these federal grants. Shortly
thereafter, the legislature directed the governor to designate the Department
of Health and Welfare as the recipient agency.228
In an advisory opinion sought by the executive branch, the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court ruled in the legislature's favor on both state and federal
law questions. Assessing state law, the court found that, under the traditional
separation of powers doctrine, the legislature had the ultimate responsibility
for creating state agencies and prescribing their duties. 229 The Court dealt
with the federal question by applying the first clear statement requirement,
discussed above,230 to the grant statute. Even though the statute specified
gubernatorial selection, and did not mention legislatures at all, the Court
found "no clear manifestation of congressional intent to override the powers
of our legislature .. .. *"231
The result seems correct, at least in the context of the particular grant
statute. The legislative history suggests strongly that Congress' main concern
was to centralize health planning and related functions somewhere in the state
government, not to favor governors over legislatures. 232 Of course, a case
might arise under a statute in which Congress explicitly denies a legislative
role in agency selection, perhaps out of concern that legislative designation of
the grantee agency for a particular program might politicize that program. 233
Testing the validity of such a statute would require application of a "state
sovereignty" balancing test.234 Even though the national interest in the
administration of a grant program is strong, it is not strong enough to justify
the use of federal grants to substantially alter the balance of power between
state legislatures and governors.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 300m(b)(1) (1976). This section provides that: a designation agreement under
subsection (a). . .is an agreement with the Governor of a State for the designation of an agency (selected by
the Governor) of the government of that State as the State health planning and development agency. . . to
administer the State administrative program . ..and to carry out the State's health planning and
development functions . . . .Id. (emphasis added).
228. Opinion of the Justices, - N.H. - , 381 A.2d 1204, 1207 (1978). In the Budget Act, the
legislature referred to "returning" responsibility for comprehensive health planning to the Department. Id.
229. - N.H. at - , 381 A.2d at 1208-09.
230. See notes 172-74 & accompanying text supra.
231. - N.H. at __, 381 A.2d at 1211. The opinion also suggested that Congress had chosen to deal
with the states and, therefore, had to accept their institutional structures.
232. S. REP. No. 1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 52-53, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7842, 7891.
233. See note 56 & accompanying text supra.
234. See notes 182-201 & accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
Legislative assertions of power over grant programs present novel and
complex issues of federal law. The Supreme Court's summary dismissal of
Shapp2 35 provides no resolution of these issues nor guidelines for future cases.
In the author's view, it is imperative to analyze such cases in the light of the
grant system itself. Grants are a partnership between independent entities of
government. If the national government wants programs to be conducted in a
manner that conflicts with state legislative authority, Congress has the option
of choosing mechanisms other than grants-in-aid. Units of state and local
government, on the other hand, at least in theory, have the option of refusing
grants that threaten state sovereignty. Thus, the supremacy clause has no
bearing on legislative initiatives that are inconsistent with the terms under
which federal aid is offered.
The task remains of construing the grant statutes setting forth these terms.
The fact that grantees will rarely exercise their option to refuse proferred aid
affords the national government opportunities to convert "our States into
provinces and our local governments into administrative precincts molded
and run by a powerful central government in Washington. ' 236 In construing
grant statutes, courts should not presume that Congress has accepted this
opportunity. In the rare case where Congress has clearly done so, the
principle of state sovereignty should block its path.
235. Thornburgh v. Casey, 99 S. Ct. 1415 (1979)(mem.).
236. H. REP. No, 1165, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106-07 (1976) (additional views of Rep. Levitas).
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